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PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS AND VICTIMS' RIGHTS: THE 
PROSECUTOR'S DUTY OF NEUTRALITY 
by 
Bennett L. ~ershman* 
In recent years, enhanced legal protections for victims has caused victims 
to become increasingly involved in the criminal justice process, often 
working closely with prosecutors. In this Article, Professor Gershman 
analyzes the potential challenges to prosecutors' ethical duties that 
victims 'participation may bring and suggests appropriate responses. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The role of the victim in the criminal justice system has increased 
dramatically in recent years. Whereas crime victims in the past lacked any 
meaningful role in the criminal justice process, crime victims today are 
afforded broad legal protections, including a right to be treated fairly and with 
dignity, a right to restitution for their injuries, a right to be protected from the 
accused, a right to be notified of and to be present at court proceedings, and a 
right to be heard at critical stages in the proceedings.' These protections are not 
Professor of Law, Pace Law School; B.A., Princeton University; J.D., New York 
University School of Law. 
' Thirty-three states now have victims' rights amendments, and every state and the 
federal government have victims' rights statutes with varying provisions. See Steven J. 
Twist, On the Wings of Their Angels, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 581, 588 n. 30 (2005) 
(listing state victims' rights amendments). Congress has recently enacted the Crime Victims' 
Rights Act, see 18 U.S.C. $ 3771(a)(2) (West, WESTLAW through March 2005 legislation), 
which affords crime victims (1) the right to be protected from the accused, (2) the right to 
timely and accurate notice of public court proceedings, (3) the right not to be excluded from 
public court proceedings, (4) the right to be heard at public court proceedings involving 
release, plea, sentencing, and parole proceedings, (5) the right to confer with the prosecutor, 
(6) the right to full and timely restitution, (7) the right to proceedings free from unreasonable 
delay, and (8) the right to be treated with fairness and respect. For the most comprehensive 
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self-executing, however. At a minimum, their enforcement requires the 
involvement and cooperation of the prosecutor.2 Yet despite the prosecutor's 
important role in safeguarding the rights of victims, there has been little 
examination of the relationship between prosecutors and victims, and the extent 
to which that relationship implicates ethical rules regulating a prosecutor's 
c ~ n d u c t . ~  In fact, examining the role of the victim in criminal procedure 
illuminates the prosecutor's role as well. 
Given the victim's critical role in identifying and punishing offenders, one 
would reasonably expect prosecutors, if only as a matter of self-interest, to 
maintain a meaningkl and cooperative relationship with crime victims and to 
aggressively protect victims' righk4 To be sure, prosecutors enjoy several 
practical advantages in prosecuting crimes against victims that are not available 
to them in victimless crimes5 First, crimes involving victims, particularly 
crimes of physical violence, abuse of vulnerable persons, and invasions of 
personal and property rights, are likely to elicit a sympathetic response from a 
jury. Second, crimes against victims often produce indisputable evidence of an 
invasive act, permitting the prosecutor and his victim to present a compelling 
story that will readily be believed by a jury.6 Third, the prosecutor, through 
skillful use of evidence and argument, can exploit a jury's natural instinct to 
treatment of victims' rights, see DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
(1999). 
The court's involvement is at least as critical as that of the prosecutor in protecting 
victims' rights. See Walker A. Matthews, 111, Proposed Victims' Rights Amendment: Ethical 
Considerations for the Prudent Prosecutor, 11 CEO. J .  LEGAL ETHICS 735, 748 (1998) 
("judges are a major factor in the long term effects of victims' rights legislation"); State v. 
Casey, 44 P.3d 756 (Utah 2002) (although prosecutor breached his duty to notify victim of 
the right to be heard at defendant's plea proceeding, court remedied the violation by 
reopening plea proceeding and allowing victim to be heard). 
' See Samuel R. Gross & Daniel J. Matheson, What They Say at the End: Capital 
Victims' Families and the Press, 88 CORNELL .  REV. 486, 513-14 (2003) (interviews with 
families of murder victims suggest that victims ordinarily take their cues from prosecutors 
whom they trust, who appear to be on the victims' side, and who have a monopoly over 
victims' cases). 
Victims, apart from their testimony, often provide investigative, financial, and tactical 
assistance to prosecutors. See, e.g.. People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310 (Cal. 1997) (victim 
underwrites significant investigative costs); State v. von Bulow, 475 A.2d 995 (R.I. 1984) 
(victim's family and their private attorney provided prosecutor with relevant evidence 
obtained from private searches and interviews of witnesses); People v. Conner, 666 P.2d 5 
(Cal. 1983) (en banc) (victim was a deputy prosecutor in same office prosecuting case); 
People v. Greer, 561 P.2d 1164 (Cal. 1977) (victim's mother employed in prosecutor's office 
and benefited from aggressive prosecution of defendant). 
These impressions are from my own experience as a prosecutor for ten years in New 
York City (1967-1976), as well as studying the criminal justice system for the past thirty 
years. To be sure, prosecutors may also enjoy advantages in prosecuting cases involving 
drugs, public corruption, white collar crimes, and organized crime. My own sense is that 
prosecuting crimes with victims gives prosecutors a surer means of winning a jury's 
sympathy and rapport than with victimless crimes. 
But see RICHARD OFSHE & ETHAN WATTERS, MAKING MONSTERS (1994) (claiming 
that victims of child abuse may be creating false narratives based on memories of abuse 
created during psychotherapy). 
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empathize with an alleged victim, and can invite revenge.' Fourth, since the 
issue before a jury usually is the victim's accuracy rather than her truthfulness, 
the prosecutor will probably be more successful in persuading a jury to accept 
the testimony of an honest but mistaken witness than the self-serving testimony 
of an unsavory witness with a strong motivation to lie (e.g., an accomplice or 
an informant).' 
Despite these advantages, a prosecutor cannot align herself exclusively 
with the ~ i c t i m . ~  A prosecutor also owes an allegiance to constituencies that are 
independent of the victim-i.e., the general public and the accused. A 
prosecutor must attempt to reconcile this tripartite responsibility to protect the 
public from harm and protect the ri hts of the accused while at the same time 
I k' protecting the rights of the victim. Needless to say, balancing these interests 
properly and effectively requires considerable skill. To the extent that a 
prosecutor aligns herself too closely with a victim, a prosecutor may 
compromise her ability to evaluate the case objectively, to weigh the credibility 
of the victim impartially, to exercise her broad discretion fairly and 
dispassionately, and to protect the legal rights of the accused." On the other 
hand, a prosecutor who seeks to zealously protect the public from harm may 
view the victim as merely a means to convict a dangerous offender, may 
undervalue the right of the victim to be afforded a meaningful role in the 
proceedings, and may disregard the right of the defendant to be treated fairly.'* 
And finally, to the extent that a prosecutor seeks to protect a defendant's 
constitutional right to a fair trial, the prosecutor may engage in conduct that 
' See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. 
See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 757 (1952) (noting that testimony of 
informers is a "dirty business" and "may raise serious questions of credibility"); Bruton v. 
United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136 (1968) (accomplice's testimony "is inevitably suspect" and 
"unreliab[le]"); Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 204 (1909) (testimony "ought not 
to be passed upon by the jury under the same rules governing other and apparently credible 
witnesses"). This is not to say that the testimony of victims does not also raise concerns over 
false accusations. See State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372 (N.J. 1994) (pretrial taint hearing 
ordered to protect against false accusations by child witnesses); People v. Pitts, 273 Cal. 
Rptr. 757 (Cal. App. 5 Dist. 1990) (false accusations of child abuse recanted and convictions 
overturned). 
The victim is not the prosecutor's client. See State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court, 
891 P.2d 246, 250 (Ariz. App. 1995) ("the prosecutor does not 'represent' the victim in a 
criminal trial; therefore, the victim is not a 'client' of the prosecutor"); ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JusnCE Standard 3-3.2 cmt. (1993) ("the prosecutor's client is not the victim but 
the people who live in the prosecutor's jurisdiction"); Carol A. Comgan, On Prosecutorial 
Ethics, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 537, 537 (1986) ("The prosecutor does not represent the 
victim of a crime, the police, or any individual. Instead, the pro?Pcutor represents society as 
a whole."). 
l o  A prosecutor's tripartite responsibility to the public, the accused, and the victim 
resembles the "three-model" framework described by Professor Douglas Beloof-i.e., the 
"Crime Control Model," the "Due Process Model," and the "Victim Participation Model." 
See Douglas Evan Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim Participation 
Model, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 289 (1 999). 
I I See infra notes 27-52 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 65-80 and accompanying text. 
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comports with legal and ethical requirements but may jeopardize the safety of 
the public and the rights of the victim.I3 
In attempting to reconcile these conflicting allegiances, a prosecutor 
receives only minimal guidance from the professional rules of ethics. These 
ethical codes, particularly the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct and 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, provide only a few specific rules 
addressing a prosecutor's ethical responsibilities to the defendant and the 
public, and do not address at all a prosecutor's ethical responsibilities to crime 
victims.I4 However, the absence of explicit guidance does not leave prosecutors 
without any ethical compass when dealing with victims. The ethical provision 
requiring a prosecutor to serve the cause of justice may provide an ethical 
framework for the prosecutor's relations with crime victims.I5 Although that 
provision is commonly understood as an obligation by the prosecutor to 
represent all of the people, not just the victim, establishing an ethical 
framework to reconcile a prosecutor's competing allegiances should focus 
initially and exclusively on that duty. 
Implementing this duty to justice requires that a prosecutor, in making 
official decisions and judgments, behave not as a partisan for any particular 
constituency but, rather, in a manner that is neutral to each cons t i t~enc~ . '~  As 
with the more general obligation to serve justice, the obligation to behave 
neutrally is neither unrealistic nor unattainable. Being neutral does not mean 
that a prosecutor should be indifferent to whether a victim suffered a grievous 
injury at the hand of the accused. Indeed, a prosecutor should feel personally 
outraged at such conduct, and if morally convinced of the defendant's guilt, is 
allowed, and indeed, obligated, to advocate that view zealously by any lawful 
and ethical means." A prosecutor does not serve justice, however, when she 
l 3  To the extent that a prosecutor has a constitutional and ethical obligation to disclose 
exculpatory evidence to the defense, such disclosure may undermine the prosecutor's ability 
to secure a conviction. See infra note 37 and accompanying text. 
l 4  See Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 
721, 725 (2001) ("Many of the rules of professional conduct, however, are blunt instruments 
- altogether inapplicable, or barely applicable, to full-time prosecutors."). It should be noted 
that the American Bar Association and the National District Attorneys Association have 
promulgated standards addressing the prosecutor's relations with victims. See ABA 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 3-3.2 (1 993); NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS, 
Standard 26.1-26.8 (1991). These standards offer guidance to prosecutors; they do not 
require compliance. 
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2004) (stating that prosecutors 
are "minister[s] of justice"); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13(3) (2004) 
(stating that prosecutors must "seek justice"). See also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JusnCE Standard 3-1.2(c) (1993) ("The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely 
to convict."); NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 1.1 (1991) ("The primary 
responsibility of prosecution is to see that justice is accomplished."). Every state has 
adopted the "do justice" standard of either the Model Rules or Model Code. 
l6 See supra note 9. See also NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 1.3 (1991) 
(prosecutor "must place the rights of society in a paramount position in exercising 
prosecutorial discretion"). 
" See Wright v. United States, 732 F.2d 1948, 1056 (2d Cir. 1984) ("If honestly 
convinced of the defendant's guilt, the prosecutor is free, indeed obliged, to be deeply 
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undertakes her official functions for personal or political reasons, has an "ax to 
grind" against the defendant, or has a special motivation to favor the victim or 
satisfy a victim's private agenda if that agenda is inconsistent with the 
prosecutor's public duty to serve all the people neutrally, i.e., equally and 
fairly. 
A prosecutor's duty of neutrality derives from several sources. First, a 
prosecutor does not represent a private client. A prosecutor's "clients" are the 
people who live in the prosecutor's 'urisdiction, including police, witnesses, 
1 1  crime victims, and even the accused. A prosecutor, as with all lawyers, has a 
fiduciary obligation to her client. But in contrast to attorneys representing 
private clients, a prosecutor's fiduciary duty requires the prosecutor to exercise 
professional judgment, as the ABA Criminal Justice Standard directs, "solely 
for the benefit of the client-the people-free of any compromising influences 
or loyalties."'9 Thus, a prosecutor's personal or private loyalties, or her political 
or ideological beliefs, must not be allowed to impede the lawful and 
professional performance of her official duties.20 
Second, as courts, commentators, and professional codes consistently 
declare, the role of a prosecutor is not to win a case (and achieve professional 
and media acclaim) but, rather, to behave in a fair and lawful manner to 
promote the cause of j~s t i ce .~ '  This requirement to serve justice means that in 
order to achieve a fair and just result, a prosecutor must, again, exercise her 
powers in an objectively fair and disinterested manner without any implication 
of partiality that might tarnish her integrity. 
Third, given a prosecutor's enormous power over people's lives, liberty, 
and reputations, as well as the limited checks on a prosecutor's discreti~n?~ a 
prosecutor has an extraordinary opportunity for her sympathies for a victim to 
influence the exercise of official discretion, entirely without review. The duty 
to remain neutral serves as an assurance to courts, individual defendants, and 
the public that a prosecutor's unreviewable discretionary choices presumably 
are unaffected by personal, political, or private interests. 
A prosecutor's relations with a crime victim may implicate a prosecutor's 
duty of neutrality in several ways. First, and at one extreme, a prosecutor's 
interested in urging that view by any fair means."). See also Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 
U.S. 238, 248 (1980) ("Prosecutors need not be entirely 'neutral and detached.' In an 
adversary system, they are necessarily permitted to be zealous in their enforcement of the 
law.") (citation omitted). 
See supra note 9. 
l 9  See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 3-1.3 cmt. at 9 (1 993). 
20 Id. 
21 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
22 See Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standard for the Prosecutor's Exercise of the 
Charging Discretion, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 5 13, 5 13 (1993) ("The prosecutor's decision to 
institute criminal charges is the broadest and least regulated power in American criminal 
law."). The prosecutor's discretion has been described as potentially "lawless," see HERBERT 
L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 290 (1968), ''tyrannical," see Henderson 
v. United States, 349 F.2d 712, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1965), and "most dangerous," see Robert H. 
Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 3 1 J.  AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3 , s  (1940). 
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interaction with a crime Victim may create an actual or apparent conflict of 
interest that impairs the prosecutor's ability to remain neutral.23 Disabling 
conflicts may exist when a prosecutor has previously represented the victim, 
has a current professional relationship with the victim or a representative of the 
victim, or represents the victim after leaving government service. Second, a 
prosecutor's duty of neutrality may be violated when a prosecutor seeks a 
conviction through inflammatory or otherwise unlawful or unethical advocacy 
on behalf of the victim.24 Third, to the extent that a prosecutor allows the victim 
to play a substantial and influential role in critical discretionary decisions- 
charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing-the prosecutor may violate the duty 
of n e ~ t r a l i t y . ~ ~  Last, and at the other extreme, a prosecutor's decision whether 
or not to force an unwilling victim to testify in order to convict a dangerous 
offender may also implicate the prosecutor's duty of neut ra~i ty .~~ Each of these 
problems is discussed below. 
11. FOUR ETHICAL PROBLEMS 
The following four hypothetical cases involve a prosecutor's interaction 
with a crime victim. These four cases are used to highlight ethical problems 
that may arise from the tension between a prosecutor's duty to seek justice and 
behave neutrally when confronted with competing demands from the public, 
the defendant, and the victim. Problems one and two describe a victim-centered 
model in which the prosecutor violates the principle of neutrality by appearing 
to advocate the interests of the victim almost exclusively, while subordinating 
the interests of the public and the accused. Problems three and four describe a 
victim-neutral model in which the prosecutor's public interest and the victim's 
interest do not coincide, and where the prosecutor's duty of neutrality requires 
conduct that is inconsistent with the interests of the victim. Analyzing the 
prosecutor's conduct in each of these problems may help illuminate the ethical 
challenges facing a prosecutor when she seeks to do justice and to safeguard a 
victim's rights. 
A. The Prosecutor as the Victim 's Surrogate 
The family of a murder victim retained an attorney in private practice (P) 
to act as co-counsel with assistant district attomey (ADA) in the second 
prosecution of the defendant for that murder.27 P was the assistant district 
23 See infra notes 27-52 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 53-64 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 65-80 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 81-92 and accompanying text. 
2' Participation of such privately employed counsel is permitted under a state law that 
provides that "[a] victim of crime or the family members of a victim of crime may employ 
private legal counsel to act as counsel with the district attorney general or the district 
attorney general's deputies in trying cases, with the extent of participation of such privately 
employed counsel being at the discretion of the district attomey general." TENN. CODE ANN. 
5 8-7-401(a) (2002). 
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attorney who prosecuted the defendant in his first trial, which ended in a hung 
jury. He had since left the district attorney's office and entered private practice. 
At the second trial, P sat at counsel table with ADA, examined most of the 
prosecution witnesses, cross-examined the defendant, and gave the closing 
argument. One month after the defendant's conviction, ADA resigned and 
entered private practice with P. The two lawyers filed a civil wrongful death 
action on behalf of the victim's family against the defendant. Did the conduct 
of ADA violate a prosecutor's duty of neutrality? 
* * * * 
The kind of conflict broadly described in Problem 1 results fiom the 
practice, followed in many states, of allowing private complainants and private 
attorneys representing victims to assist the prosecution, and even to prosecute 
the case t h e m s e l v e ~ . ~ ~  The risk of a disqualifying conflict, as well as a 
constitutional violation, is clear. In Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et 
Fils s .A . ,~~  the Supreme Court established a categorical rule against the practice 
in federal courts of appointing private counsel for an interested party that is the 
beneficiary of a court order from bringing a contempt prosecution alleging a 
violation of that order. Recognizing the "fundamental premise" that a 
prosecutor must wield her formidable criminal enforcement powers in a 
rigorously disinterested fashion,)' the Court declared that the appointment of an 
interested prosecutor "creates an appearance of improprie that diminishes tY faith in the fairness of the criminal justice system in general." ' 
As in Young, the prosecution of crimes against victims may present 
conflicts of interest that can threaten the prosecutor's neutrality and violate 
ethical and constitutional rules. Problem 1 illustrates the potential for conflict 
when so-called "private prosecutors" or "special prosecutors" hired by the 
victim or the victim's family assist the prosecution. As noted above, although 
criticized by courts32 and ~ommenta tors ,~~ and subject to various limitations, 
28 Every American jurisdiction provides for a public prosecutor's office to prosecute 
criminal cases in the name of the state. However, several jurisdictions in the U.S. also allow 
the use of privately retained prosecutors for interested parties. See John D. Bessler, The 
Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L. REV. 5 11 
(1994); Andrew Sidman, The Outmoded Concept of Private Prosecution, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 
754 (1976). Moreover, some jurisdictions allow private individuals to prosecute minor 
crimes themselves. Compare Cronan ex rel. State v. Cronan, 774 A.2d 866 (R.I. 2001) 
(upholding assault victim's right to initiate by private complaint and prosecute defendant for 
misdemeanor assault) with New Jersey v. Imperiale, 773 F. Supp. 747 (D.N.J. 1991) 
(conflict of interest for private citizen pursuant to state rule to initiate and prosecute assault 
charges). 
29 481 U.S. 787 (1987). 
'O Id. at 810 ("It is a fundamental premise of our society that the state wield its 
formidable criminal enforcement powers in a rigorously disinterested fashion, for liberty 
itself may be at stake in such matters."). 
" Id. at 811 ("If a prosecutor uses the expansive prosecutorial powers to gather 
information for private purposes, the prosecution function has been seriously abused."). 
32 See Jones v. Richards, 776 F.2d 1244, 1247 (4th Cir. 1985) ("use of private 
prosecutors who are also representing plaintiffs in civil actions against the criminal 
defendant should be discouraged"); Woods v. Linahan, 648 F.2d 973, 977 (5th Cir. 1981) 
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the common-law practice of allowing private counsel retained by a crime 
victim or the family of a crime victim to assist the prosecution is allowed in 
many states.34 To the extent that such a practice compromises the integrity of 
the prosecution, it would violate the ethical rule against a prosecutor "servin 
two masters" and thereby failing to serve the cause of justice single-mindedly. 3g 
Problem 1 describes such a compromising situation. Here, a crime victim, 
represented by a "private" or "special" prosecutor, may be able to exert 
considerable leverage in the prosecution of the defendant. By having a victim's 
private lawyer assist the prosecutor and engage in prosecutorial activities, as P 
did, the victim can significantly influence the prosecution and the prosecutor's 
exercise of critical discretionary decisions. For example, since a private 
prosecutor's ethical allegiance is to her client, the victim, it is unlikely that 
ADA would acce t an offer from the defendant to plead guilty if the victim P6 opposed the plea. By the same token, it is questionable whether ADA would 
readily disclose exculpatory evidence to the defen~e.~'  Moreover, that the 
victim probably influenced ADA's exercise of official discretion is evidenced 
by the attorneys' subsequent private practice affiliation and the bringing of a 
civil lawsuit against the defendant.38 
The prosecutors' conduct described in Problem 1 is clearly unethical. Even 
if the victim did not actually influence the actions of the prosecutors, the 
appearance that the victim influenced the prosecution for private interests 
("we note our concern about the practice of using a private attorney"); State v. Eldridge, 951 
S.W.2d 775,780 (Tenn. App. 1997) ("special dangers inherent in private prosecution"). 
33 See Bessler, supra note 28, at 598 ("state courts should hold that it is a per se 
violation of a defendant's constitutional rights if a private prosecutor for an interested party 
participates in any way in the criminal trial of that defendant"). See also Eldridge, 951 
S.W.2d at 786. ("[Tlhe participation by private counsel in the discretionary functions of the 
district attorney general is of greater concern because of not only the ethical dilemma faced 
by private counsel but also the inherent inadequacy of judicial review of potential abuses of 
those discretionary functions by private counsel.") (Welles, J., concurring) (emphasis in 
original). 
34 Bessler, supra note 28, at 529-40 (listing jurisdictions allowing private prosecutors 
under existing statutes and case law). 
- 
35 For cases finding the use of private prosecutors violated due process, see Ganger v. 
Peyton, 379 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967); Hughes v. Bowers, 71 1 F. Supp. 1574 (N.D. Ga. 
1989); Adkins v. Commonwealth, 492 S.E.2d 833 (Va. App. 1997); State v. Eldridge, 951 
S.W.2d 775 (Tern. App. 1997); Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 22 (Va. 1985). 
36 See Ganger, 379 F.2d at 713-14 ("strong possibility that the prosecuting attorney 
may have abdicated to the prosecuting witness (Ganger's wife) in the criminal case the 
exercise of his responsibility and discretion in making charge decisions. If she did not 
actually make the decision to prosecute for felonious assault, certainly her interests were 
influential, and those conflicting interests may have impeded appropriate plea bargaining"). 
37 A prosecutor has a constitutional and ethical obligation to disclose exculpatory 
evidence to the defense. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); MODEL RULES OF 
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2004); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13(3); 
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSnCE Standard 3-3.11(a) (1993). 
38 See Dick v. Scroggy, 882 F.2d 192, 195, 196 (6th Cir. 1989) (court finds that 
prosecutor's representation of victim in civil action less than one month after prosecuting 
defendant for assaulting victim, while "unseemly" and "less than disinterested," did not 
violate due process). 
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unrelated to the public interest is sufficient to compromise the integrity of the 
trial from an ethical standpoint.39 Whether such unethical conduct compromises 
the fairness of a trial as a matter of due process is a different question, however, 
and depends on several factors: (1) whether P had an actual pecuniary or 
personal interest in the outcome of the case;40 (2) the degree to which ADA 
exercised control over the prosecution and preserved the neutral prosecutorial 
role and fun~tion;~ '  and (3) whether ADA had an interest in any pending civil 
case concerning the same facts as the criminal case.42 
A good exam le of a constitutional violation by a private prosecutor is 
Hughes v. Bowers.' In that case, a federal district court vacated the defendant's 
manslaughter conviction based on the misconduct of a private attorney hired by 
the victim's family as a "special prosecutor" to assist the district attorney. 
Despite a request from the defense for evidence of the existence of insurance 
policies on the life of the deceased that would have impeached the testimony of 
relatives of the deceased, the special prosecutor, apparently with the district 
attorney's knowledge and acquiescence, misled the defense and the court by 
falsely denying the existence of such policies and then eliciting testimony that 
no policies existed.44 The federal court concluded that the presence of a special 
prosecutor is not constitutionally improper per se, and that a defendant must 
establish either that the district attorney failed to retain control and 
management of the case or that the special prosecutor engaged in specific 
misconduct that prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial.45 The court 
found that the special prosecutor had a personal financial stake in securing the 
defendant's conviction, and that his nondisclosure of the existence of the 
insurance policies constituted prejudicial mi~conduc t .~~  
Problem 1 is not as clear-cut as Bowers, but presents similar problems. 
First, there is no indication that the plaintiff was involved in civil litigation on 
behalf of the victim's family at the time of the criminal prosecution; nor is there 
any indication that the ADA, despite ceding extensive prosecutorial authority to 
plaintiff, did not retain control of the prosecution and the various discretionary 
decisions needed to be made. Nor is there any indication of any actual 
misconduct by plaintiff or the ADA that prejudiced the defendant's right to a 
fair trial. It appears very likely, however, that the prosecution was intended to 
39 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 9-6 (2004) (lawyer has duty "to 
avoid not only professional impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety"). 
40 See People v. Zimmer, 414 N.E.2d 705 (N.Y.1980) (district attorney who prosecuted 
charges against defendant was simultaneously representing corporation against whom 
defendant alleged to have committed crimes). 
4' See Eldridge, 951 S.W.2d at 780 ("The majority of jurisdictions that allow the use of 
private prosecutors, by statute or case law, requires the public prosecutor's consent and 
retention of control over the case."). 
42 Ganger, 379 F.2d at 71 1 (prosecution of criminal case at same time that prosecutor 
was representing defendant's wife in divorce proceeding based upon same alleged assault). 
43 711 F. Supp 1574 (N.D. Ga. 1989). 
44 Id. at 1580. 
45 Id. at 1582. 
46 Id. at 1584. 
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further a private agenda, particularly in view of the plaintiff and ADA's 
subsequent affiliation, as well as their joint representation of the victim's 
family in a civil action against the defendant. 
- 
Opportunities for conflicts resulting from a prosecutor's simultaneous 
representation of a private client, as in Problem 1, are also likely to occur when 
a prosecutor is employed part-time pursuant to state or local law, as are many 
47 prosecutors. There is always a significant risk of a part-time prosecutor 
becoming involved in private matters that might relate to official matters. At 
one extreme, quite obviously, is a prosecutor who has a financial stake in the 
defendant's conviction based on his simultaneous private representation of the 
crime victim.48 Although Problem 1 does not expressly indicate that either the 
plaintiff or the ADA had a pecuniary interest in the victim's case during the 
pendency of the prosecution, it is reasonable to assume that they were aware of 
the potential financial value of a civil action if the defendant were convicted. 
Other cases, however, describe how a part-time prosecutor's private financial 
interest in the victim's case may compromise a defendant's constitutional right 
to a fair trial. 
In Ganger v. ~ e ~ t o n ? ~  for example, the defendant's state conviction for 
assaulting his wife was vacated on due process grounds based on the part-time 
prosecutor's conflict of interest and misconduct. The prosecutor represented the 
wife in a divorce action which was precipitated by an assault on her by her 
husband. While representing the wife, the prosecutor initiated a prosecution 
against the husband for assault. The prosecutor then offered to drop the assault 
charge if the defendant husband made a divorce settlement favorable to the 
wife. The prosecutor's obvious self-interest in the civil litigation, particularly 
because the size of his fee might depend on the success of his prosecution, 
prevented him from exercising impartial judgment in the criminal case." The 
court noted the strong likelihood that the prosecutor abdicated his official 
responsibility and discretion concerning whether to prosecute, reduce the 
charge, or recommend a suspended sentence.'' The prosecutor's conduct "in 
47 According to the most recent oficial survey, approximately one-fourth of all U.S. 
prosecutors in state courts are employed part-time. See CAROL J. DEFRANCES, U.S. DEPT. OF 
JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS m TATE COURTS, 2001 at 1 (July I, 2002). 
48 See People v. Zirnmer, 414 N.E.2d 705 (N.Y. 1980) (district attorney, at time he 
prosecuted case, was also counsel to and stockholder of corporation in the course of whose 
management the defendant alleged to have committed "white collar" crimes with which he 
was charged). 
49 379 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967). 
50 Id. at 712. The state attorney general conceded as much on appeal, and the state 
ethics committee "unequivocally condemned the practice. Id. at 712 n.3. 
5' Id. at 713 ("Because of the prosecuting attorney's own self-interest in the civil 
litigation (including the possibility that the size of his fee would be determined by what 
could be exacted from defendant), he was not in a position to exercise fair-minded judgment 
with respect to (1) whether to decline to prosecute, (2) whether to reduce the chargk to a 
lesser degree of assault, or (3) whether to recommend a suspended sentence or other 
clemency"). 
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attempting at once to serve two masters," the court concluded, violated due 
process.52 
B. The Prosecutor as the Victim 's Avenger 
Defendant was indicted for capital murder for the stabbing deaths of his 
former girlfriend, Victoria, and two of her children, Robert, age 10, and Emily, 
age 3. The killings occurred in Victoria's apartment two nights before 
Christmas. The defendant surrendered the next day, gave a detailed confession 
to the police, and claimed he was in a drunken and jealous rage. In announcing 
the indictment at a press conference, the district attorney stood beside 
Victoria's parents, other family members, and Victoria's only other child, 
Daniel, age 7, who was staying at his grandparent's apartment across the street 
on the night of the killings. The district attorney described the scene as a 
"house of horror, blood, and carnage-pools of blood were everywhere." She 
stated that this was "the most horrendous case" she ever prosecuted. She also 
praised Daniel as "a courageous little boy, a survivor" and claimed that the case 
demonstrates the need for the death penalty. Popular and charismatic, the 
district attorney routinely portrayed herself as a champion of crime victims. 
The district attorney refused to accept the defendant's offer to plead guilty to 
Murder in the First Degree and be sentenced to life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole. 
During the trial, the district attorney engaged in the following conduct: to 
counter the defense suggestion that Victoria had left her children every night 
during the week before Christmas drinking and partying, the district attorney 
offered a family photo showing Victoria with her arms around her three 
children in her apartment the night before the killings amidst Christmas 
decorations; and although police witnesses described the murder scene, and 
introduced crime scene and autopsy photographs, the district attorney called 
Daniel as her last witness. Daniel had arrived in the apartment early in the 
morning after his sleepover at his grandparents. He ran to a neighbor crying, 
"Mommy, mommy. . .She won't wake up. . .There's blood." In her closing 
argument, the district attorney asked the jury to avenge the killings. She 
concluded her summation with the following: "If you listen closely, you can 
hear Victoria crying from her grave, 'Avenge me. Avenge my little boy. 
Avenge my baby girl."' Has the district attorney violated her ethical duty to 
seek justice and act neutrally? 
* * * *  
For personal, political, or tactical reasons, some prosecutors portray 
themselves as "Champions of the People" committed to protecting victims of 
53 crime. By involving themselves too closely in the personal tragedies of their 
52 Id. at 7 14. 
53 See Bennett L. Gershman, The Thin Blue Line: Art or Trial in the Fact-Finding 
Process? 9 PACE L. REV. 275,3 13 (1989) ("The popular myth about the prosecutor is that he 
is 'Mr. District Attorney,' a 'Champion of the People,' a virtuous protector, and even a 
'Minister of Justice. "'). 
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victims, however, these prosecutors may find it difficult to carry out their 
ethical responsibilities. Such prosecutors are elected officials who typically 
campaign on a victim-centered agenda, emphasize their win-loss record of 
convictions, advocate wider use of the death penalty, and portray themselves 
generally as seeking justice through vengeance.54 For example, a district 
attorney in New York State has gained prominence by promoting such a 
victim-centered agenda. Her recent book, To Punish and Protect opens with the 
following passage: 
The office of the District Attorney is a battleground, where the fight 
between good and evil unfolds each day. We see the ugliest side of life, 
the pain that people go through for no reason. They didn't do anything. 
They didn't ask for it. Yet here they are, living their personal nightmares. 
We cannot take away their pain or turn back time to undo the damage, 
but we can be the avengers. We can seek justice on their behalf.55 
This view, which is probably shared by many other prosecutors and much 
of the public, is not aty ical. Given the increased attention to victims in the 
?6 criminal justice process, the prominence of advocacy groups that lobby on 
behalf of victims rights,57 and the increased legal obligations on prosecutors to 
58 . . involve victims in various aspects of the decision-making process, ~t 1s to be 
expected that prosecutors, particularly those that run for elected office, would 
align themselves closely with the victim, as has the district attorney in Problem 
2. However, a prosecutor's close association and identification with victims 
presents complex ethical and constitutional problems, some of which are 
illustrated in Problem 2. 
In the first place, it is at least arguable that such prosecutors, insofar as 
they promote a strong and explicit message that their official decisions and 
judgments are explicitly undertaken to "avenge" the "pain" and "personal 
nightmares" experienced by the victim, may find it difficult to evaluate the 
merits of a case and the credibility of the victim objectively, and may not be 
able to enforce the broad array of rules that protect a defendant's legal rights. 
For example, as noted in Problem 2, was the district attorney's refusal to accept 
the defendant's plea offer to an admittedly horrific crime based on an objective 
assessment of the merits of the case, and whether such plea would serve the 
ends of justice, or was the refusal based on the district attorney's pro-victim 
and pro-death penalty agenda? Moreover, can a prosecutor with a mindset bent 
54 See Kenneth Bresler, "I Never Lost a Trial": When Prosecutors Keep Score of 
Criminal Convictions, 9 GEO. J .  LEGAL ETHICS 537 (1996). See also Kenneth Bresler, 
Seeking Justice, Seeking Election, and Seeking the Death Penalty: The Ethics of 
Prosecutorial Candidates' Campaigning on Capital Convictions, 7 GEO. J .  LEGAL ETHICS 
941 (1994). 
55 See JEANINE PIRRO, TO PUNISH AND PROTECT: A DA's FIGHT AGAINST A SYSTEM 
THAT CODDLES CRIMINALS 1 (2003). 
56 See supra note 1 ,  and accompanying text. See also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 
808, 834 (1991) (noting "public sense of justice keen enough that it has found voice in a 
nationwide 'victims rights' movement") (Scalia, J. ,  concuning). 
57 Id. at 867 (listing numerous victim advocacy groups submitting amicus briefs). 
58 See supra notes 14-16, and accompanying text. 
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on vengeance be trusted to disclose to the defense, as ethical and constitutional 
rules require, evidence that might exculpate the defendant or impeach 
prosecution witnesses?59 
Further, given the ability of a prosecutor to use the media in ways that 
might prejudice a defendant's case and advance her own personal interests, will 
a prosecutor voluntarily limit public, extra-judicial statements that might 
reasonably impair a defendant's right to a fair trial before an impartial jury?60 
The temptation to manipulate the media is probably greatest when a prosecutor 
holds a press conference to announce an indictment that describes a brutal 
crime of violence against a vulnerable victim. For example, in Problem 2, the 
district attorney, at her press conference, made several statements that arguably 
were inflammatory and improper. The district attorney graphically described 
the heinousness of the crime, the courage of the young survivor, and the need 
for the death penalty. Such comments arguably violate ethical provisions that 
restrict a prosecutor's extra-judicial statements to the media that might impair a 
defendant's right to a fair trial.61 
Additionally, the prosecution of crimes of violence against victims often 
gives the prosecutor an opportunity to engage in inflammatory tactics that 
appeal to the jurors' fears, passions, and biases.62 Such tactics usually involve a 
59 Nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence by prosecutors is a frequent basis for reversal 
of convictions. See Ken Annstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial & Error. How Prosecutors 
Sacrifzce Justice to Win, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Jan. 10-14 1999 (five-part series reporting that 
38 1 homicide convictions nationwide were reversed because prosecutors concealed evidence 
suggesting defendants' innocence or presented evidence they knew to be false). 
60 Ethical codes bar lawyers from making extra-judicial statements that might impair a 
fair trial. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a) (2004) (lawyer "shall not make 
an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by 
means of public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will 
have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the 
matter"); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILIN DR 7-107(D) (2004) (lawyer "shall not 
make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would 
expect to be disseminated"). 
6' See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L 
RESPONSIBILIN DR 7- 107(D). 
. , 
62 The extent to which a jury in a criminal trial should be exposed to evidence 
introduced for purely emotional reasons is admittedly a complex and controversial issue. 
See Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 38 (1952) (a criminal trial "should have the 
atmosphere of an operating room") (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The reality is otherwise, as 
most courts and commentators recognize. But see Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 
(1991) (allowing capital sentencing jury to consider "victim impact evidence" that may be 
highly inflammatory). It is unethical for prosecutors to engage in inflammatory conduct to 
prove a defendant's guilt when that evidence is deliberately used to appeal to the prejudices 
of the jury. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 3-5.6(c) (1993) (unethical 
to permit tangible items to be displayed to the jury that would prejudice fair consideration of 
the evidence); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 3-5.6(d) (1993) (unethical 
for prosecutor to offer in evidence tangible items in view that would prejudice jury unless 
there exists a reason for its admission); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 
3-5.8 (1993) (unethical for prosecutor to make arguments calculated to appeal to prejudices 
of jury). See also FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note (rule excluding evidence 
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deliberate attempt to prejudice a defendant's right to a fair trial by improperly 
influencing the jury's evaluation of the evidence. For example, in Problem 2, 
the district attorney's introduction of the "in-life" photo of Victoria and her 
children, the calling of young Daniel as a witness, and the "revenge" comments 
in the closing argument, appear to be calculated to appeal to the prejudices of 
the jury. A call for ven eance is clearly out of bounds and would be 
condemned by all courts.b9 The introduction of the "in-life" photo and the 
calling of young Daniel would probably be permitted if a prosecutor could 
establish that the proof had some probative value.@ However, a prosecutor 
committed to justice and neutrality might be more restrained in offering the "in- 
life" photo, or calling Daniel as a witness, particularly if the proof of guilt was 
strong, and the evidence was unnecessary and gratuitously inflammatory, as in 
Problem 2. 
C. Compromising the Prosecutor's Discretion 
Paul, a white, thirty-five year old accountant, was robbed in the lobby of 
his building and stabbed in the stomach. He was hospitalized for a month. He 
gave the police a detailed description of his assailant. Several months later, the 
police notified him that they had arrested a suspect in his case and wanted Paul 
to view a line-up. Paul immediately identified the defendant, a twenty-five year 
old black male with a record of petty thefts and drug possessions. Paul told the 
police and the prosecutor that he was absolutely certain that defendant was the 
person who attacked him. 
The prosecutor has encountered some problems with the case. There is no 
corroboration, defendant has an alibi, and three of the persons in the six person 
line-up bore no similarity to defendant. The prosecutor knows that cases that 
hinge on single eyewitness identifications are notoriously difficult and the 
prosecutor knows that defense counsel is adept at exploiting these weaknesses. 
Defendant has offered to plead guilty to Attempted Robbery in the Third 
Degree, a felony punishable by four years imprisonment. The prosecutor has 
advised Paul of the plea offer and told Paul that given the nature of the case and 
the risks of going to trial, it appears to be an appropriate disposition. Paul 
adamantly disagrees, replying: "No. I can't do that. He almost killed me. I want 
based on "unfair prejudice" refers to evidence that has "undue tendency to suggest decision 
on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one"). 
63 See People v. Lombardi, 229 N.E.2d 206,209 (N.Y. 1967) (condemning prosecutor's 
reference to victim crying out for vengeance). 
64 The admissibility in a murder trial of "in-life" photos of the deceased has divided the 
courts. Juxtaposing an autopsy photograph of the deceased next to a photograph depicting 
what the deceased looked like before her death can be highly prejudicial. Some courts 
exclude such "in-life" photographs unless the picture is relevant to some issue in the trial. 
See, e.g., People v. Stevens, 599 N.E.2d 1278 (N.Y. 1990). Other courts have held that there 
is no inherent prejudice in use of "in-life" photographs even when not relevant to any issue. 
See Lilly v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 522 (Va. 1998). For a helpful discussion of the use 
of "in-life" photos in homicide cases, see Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice: 
The Case for and the Effects of Utah's Victims ' Rights Amendment, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 
1373,1407-09 (1994). 
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to go to trial." Assuming the prosecutor seeks to do justice and behave 
neutrally, what should she do? 
* * * *  
To be effective a prosecutor ordinarily needs to maintain a cooperative 
relationship with a crime victim. A prosecutor obviously wants to present her 
case as convincingly as possible, and does not want to elicit testimony from a 
witness who is resentful, who may damage the case during courtroom 
interrogation, or who may attract negative attention from the media. 
Prosecutors, however, have treated victims in ways that are counterproductive 
to the cause of justice and the public good.65 Thus, a prosecutor is likely to 
impair her ability to achieve a successful result if she fails to respect a victim's 
interests, convenience, and attitudes about the case, or if she neglects to keep a 
victim informed about the progress of a case.66 For example, a prosecutor is 
likely to alienate a victim and cause profound resentment if a prosecutor fails to 
notify a victim about the impending service of a subpoena, scheduling changes, 
the status of a case, or discretionary decisions concerning filing charges, 
dismissing charges, or pursuing a disposition by a guilty plea. 
Before the advent of victims' rights legislation and ethical guidelines 
addressing a prosecutor's relations with victims, prosecutors would typically 
make discretionary decisions unilaterally and often fail to notify the victim 
about the disposition of the case.67 A victim interested in the status of a case 
would usually have to take the initiative to contact the prosecutor or the court, 
and even if the victim was dissatisfied with the disposition, or wanted to bring 
the matter to a judge's attention, the victim would have virtually no legal 
recourse to affect any change in the result. 
65 See Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 5 2, 96 Stat. 
1248 (1982) (crime victims "have been transformed into a group oppressively burdened by a 
system designed to protect them," "are either ignored by the criminal justice or simply used 
as tools to identify and punish offenders, and "forced to suffer physical, psychological, or 
financial hardship first as a result of the criminal act and then as a result of contact with a 
criminal justice system unresponsive to the real needs of such victim"); ABA STANDARDS, 
Commentary to Standard 3-3.2 (victims often conclude that criminal justice system "part of 
the problem" which results in "unfortunate and counterproductive alienation from the 
interests of the criminal justice system"). Moreover, victims who felt aggrieved by the 
system lacked standing to bring a formal complaint. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 
614 (1973). 
See 18 U.S.C. 5 3771 (a)(2) (West, WESTLAW through March 2005 legislation) 
(victim's "right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public court proceeding, or 
any parole proceeding, involving the crime or of any release or escape of the accused"); 
ABA STANDARDS, Standard 3-3.2 (c) ("The prosecutor should readily provide victims and 
witnesses who request it information about the status of the of cases in which they are 
interested."); NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 26.1 (victims "should be 
informed of all initial stages in the criminal justice proceedings to the extent feasible," 
including filing of charges, determination of pre-trial release, any pre-trial disposition, date 
and results of trial, date and results of sentencing, any proceeding in which may result in 
defendant's release from incarceration, and other proceedings which may place victim at risk 
of harm or harassment). 
67 See supra note 64, and accompanying text. 
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Today, however, participation by victims in the criminal justice process 
enjoys broad constitutional and statutory protection.68 Crime victims currently 
have the right to be consulted prior to a prosecutor making ke discretionary 
65y decisions and to be heard when the defendant pleads guilty. The question 
posed by Problem 3, however, goes beyond giving the victim an opportunity to 
be consulted or to be heard when the guilty plea is taken. Problem 3 raises the 
question of the extent to which a victim has the ability to veto a prosecutor's 
exercise of discretion, for example, by requiring a prosecutor to alter his 
professional judgment in order to bring a particular plea or sentence into 
conformity with the dictates of a victim's private agenda. 
Despite the enhanced status of victims, neither the victim nor his 
representatives have the power to control a prosecutor's discretionary 
decisions, particularly in the plea disposition process.70 The position of most 
prosecutors undoubtedly is that while the victim should have an opportunity to 
consult with the prosecutor and provide relevant information to the prosecutor 
and the court, it is the prosecutor who retains the ultimate authority to make 
decisions without regard to the victim's views on the matter." Indeed, if a 
prosecutor were to cede to the victim the authority to make discretionary 
decisions, a prosecutor would be violating his duty to exercise prosecutorial 
authority fairly, neutrally, and equitably for all of the people. As noted earlier, 
the ABA Standards emphasize that "the prosecutor's client is not the victim but 
the people who live in the prosecutor's jurisdiction, [and] the prosecutor 
obviously retains the discretionary authority to make [discretionary] decisions 
without regard to the victim's - or any other person's - views on the matter."72 
Nevertheless, there have been occasions when prosecutors have given 
victims or their representatives the functional equivalent of a veto over plea 
deals with  defendant^.^^ These cases raise troubling questions over whether, by 
68 AS Professor Douglas Beloof has observed, the inclusion of the victim as a key 
participant in criminal procedure "has shaken conventional assumptions about the criminal 
process to their foundation." See Beloof, supra note 10, at 290. 
69 See supra note 1, and accompanying text. 
'O See State v. McDonnell, 794 P.2d 780 (Or. 1990) (prosecutor must be guided by 
public interest and "cannot delegate to others this responsibility for carrying out public 
policy."). See also Sarah N .  Welling, Victim Participation in Plea Bargains, 65 WASH.  U. L. 
Q. 301, 338 (1987) (noting that victims traditionally had no formal or recognized rights 
regarding plea bargains and advocating greater role of victims); BELOOF, supra note 1, at 
462-70 (describing increased victims' participation in plea bargains). 
7 1 But see State v. Casey, 44 P.3d 756 (Utah 2002) (prosecutor breached duty under 
state Victims' Rights Act by failing to notify victim of plea and by failing to notify the court 
of victim's request to be heard at plea proceeding). The court in Casey does not indicate 
whether there exists any remedy for the prosecutor's breach. Indeed, the right of the victim 
to be heard at the change of plea hearing may be illusory. See id. at 767 ("the right of a 
victim to be heard at a change of plea hearing is fragile at best, and may be made illusory by 
the intentional or unintentional mishandling of the situation by the prosecutor or the trial 
court, -- all without meaningful remedy.") (Wilkins, J., concumng). 
72 See supra note 8, and accompanying text. 
73 See McKenzie v. Risley, 842 F.2d 1525 (9th Cir. 1988) (no error in prosecutor's 
rejection in capital murder case to accept defendant's offer to plead guilty in exchange for 
receiving a fifty-year sentence based on refusal of victim's family to approve the deal). 
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allowing victims to influence their discretion in this manner, prosecutors are 
behaving responsibly or, more likely, are promoting the appearance of unequal 
justice. Two highly publicized criminal prosecutions in New York state 
illustrate the problem. In the racially charged and highly publicized 1989 
slaying of Yusuf Hawkins, a young black man in Brooklyn, by a gang of white 
youths, A1 Sharpton, a representative of the victim's family, advised the 
victim's family to "veto" an offer by two of the defendants to plead guilty. The 
plea would have subjected them to substantial terms of imprisonment on felony 
charges.74 Deferring to the victim's family, the Brooklyn District Attorney 
rejected the plea and proceeded to trial. News of that "veto" became 
particularly controversial after Mr. Sharpton's involvement in the plea 
negotiation was disclosed, the implication was that the family's veto of the plea 
may have been to further Mr. Sharpton's political agenda. The dangers inherent 
in such a situation were manifest when, after the defendants were acquitted, 
Sharpton blamed the prosecutor for "botching" the case.75 
In another highly publicized murder case - the prosecution of Robert 
Chambers for killing Jennifer Levin in Central Park - the Manhattan District 
Attorney reported that he had accepted the defendant's guilty lea to 
manslaughter only after the victim's family gave their approval.'' While 
acceptance of the plea appeared to be the correct decision, the prosecutor's 
gratuitous public reference to the role played by the victim's family, and his 
announced refusal to accept the plea without the family's approval, suggested 
that the prosecutor sought the family's approval to justify a politically 
controversial de~ision.~' Such a statement merely encourages the cynical view 
that some defendants are treated differently than others depending on the 
prosecutor's relations with the victim. 
There is one area in which the victim's concerns may receive special 
attention: death penalty cases. Such disparate treatment probably is not 
uncommon. In deciding whether to seek the death penalty or allow a capital 
defendant to plead guilty to a certain term of life imprisonment, some 
prosecutors may rely heavily on the views of the victim's family.78 Indeed, it 
has been suggested that the views of the victim's family in capital cases, on 
whether they wish to see the defendant live or die, often may be dispositive 
with respect to the prosecutor's decision to accept a guilty plea.79 To these 
74 See Joel Cohen, Should Prosecutors Obey the Wishes of Crime Victims in 
Negotiating Pleas?, N.Y.L.J., April 30, 1991, at 1. 
75 Id. 
76 See Kirk Johnson, Chambers, With Jury at Impasse, Admits 1st Degree 
Manslaughter, N.Y. TIMES, March 26, 1988, at 1 (according to the district attorney, "without 
the family's approval, the plea bargain would not have been accepted by his office and the 
case would likely have been tried again."). 
77 See Cohen, supra note 74. 
'' See McKenzie , 842 F.2d 1525 (prosecutor rejects plea bargain in capital murder case 
based on unwillingness of victim's family to approve the deal). 
79 In a telephone conversation with Kevin Doyle, head of New York State's Capital 
Defender Unit, Mr. Doyle stated that prosecutors often make decisions on whether to seek 
the death penalty or permit a defendant to plead guilty to life without parole based on the 
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prosecutors, as well as under the law, the magnitude of the crime and the 
enormous impact it has on the survivors apparently gives them a special claim 
to being heard on the ultimate punishment. 
The prosecutor in Problem 3 has an obligation to consult with Paul over 
the plea, which he did. The prosecutor needed to advise Paul of the likelihood 
of success at trial, the differences in potential applicable penalties, the 
emotional costs of proceeding to trial, and the right of Paul to convey to the 
court after a conviction the impact that D's crime had on Paul. To be sure, the 
views of Paul as to whether the prosecutor should accept the plea are an 
important factor in the prosecutor's decision. Moreover, Paul should have the 
opportunity to communicate his views to the court before the court accepts the 
plea and at the defendant's sentencing.80 But, ultimately, the decision whether 
to accept a plea is the prosecutor's, and he must use his best professional 
judgment in making that decision. Giving Paul a veto over the plea, as in the 
cases described above, would appear to violate the prosecutor's duty to serve 
justice and would encourage the view that some victims are the beneficiaries of 
special and unequal justice. 
D. The Unwilling Victim 
The defendant has been arrested, accused by the police of being the 
notorious "Bedroom Bandit," who has burglarized and raped women in their 
suburban homes wearing a mask and threatening their life unless they submit to 
him. Only one of the victims, Kay, was able to make a positive identification, 
after the assailant's mask slipped off during the attack. Three other victims 
could only give a general description of the perpetrator's height and build. The 
totality of the evidence-Kay's testimony, the testimony of the other victims, 
the defendant's prior criminal record for burglary and rape, his suspicious 
absences from work during the hours when the crimes were committed, and a 
false alibi for one of the occurrences-convinces the prosecutor that the 
defendant is the serial rapist. Prior to trial, Kay has advised the prosecutor that 
she will not proceed with her testimony. The horrible memory of the event, the 
intense pressure from law enforcement officials to relive it, the exposure of the 
case to incessant media attention, and the terror she feels over having to appear 
in public to testify, have been so traumatic and so unremitting for her and her 
family that she wants no further involvement in the case. The defendant 
protests his innocence, and there is no possibility of a plea bargain that would 
be acceptable to both sides. Assuming the prosecutor seeks to serve justice and 
behave neutrally, what are his options? 
Problem 4 highlights a difficult ethical challenge to a prosecutor seeking 
justice in a neutral fashion, namely, the extent to which a prosecutor should 
wishes of the victim's family. Telephone Interview with Kevin Doyle, head of New York 
State's Capital Defender Unit (Feb. 4, 2005). 
See supra note I ,  and accompanying text. 
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employ coercive tactics to force an unwilling victim to appear and testify. The 
problem gained national attention recently when the woman who accused 
basketball star Kobe Bryant of sexual assault was unwilling to testify and the 
prosecutor agreed to drop all charges.8' A similar dissolution of a criminal case 
based on an unwilling victim occurred in 1993, when Los Angeles prosecutors 
dropped their investigation of pop singer Michael Jackson, on sexual abuse 
charges, after the thirteen year old boy settled his civil lawsuit for over $15 
million and refused to proceed with the criminal case.** 
Moreover, the challenge to a prosecutor from an unwilling victim is highly 
controversial, and not unusual, in domestic violence prosecutions. For example, 
the prosecution of football star Warren Moon for battering his wife generated 
considerable media attention in 1993 when the prosecutor forced Moon's wife 
to testify over her objection, and she recanted her earlier statements that her 
husband had assaulted her.83 By way of contrast, the Los Angeles District 
Attorney's Office dropped domestic assault charges against O.J. Simpson in 
1993 after his wife, Nicole Brown Simpson, refused to press charges.84 
Problem 4 assumes that the prosecutor is seeking in good faith to serve 
justice, is morally certain that the defendant is the notorious "Bedroom Bandit," 
and is confident that with Kay's testimony he has more than sufficient evidence 
to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecutor also 
is convinced that justice and the public good demand that the defendant be 
prosecuted, convicted, and punished as retribution for his:serious crimes and to 
deter future violence by others. However, the prosecutor's desire to prosecute 
zealously is tempered by his concern for Kay's health, privacy, and autonomy. 
The prosecutor must try to overcome Kay's reluctance by impressing upon her 
the importance of the case and the indispensability of her testimony, and will 
likely employ specialized ps chological services to work with Kay to overcome 
8 Y  her reluctance to testify. In the event Kay still refuses to testi the 
prosecutor will consider the use of legal process to force her to testify5 The 
prosecutor plainly is ambivalent over whether forcing Kay to testify is a 
responsible exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 
See Kirk Johnson, As Accuser Balks, Prosecutors Drop Bryant Rape Case, N.Y. 
TIMES. Sevt. 2.2004. at Al .  
. . 
82' For a vivid description of this settlement, as well as excerpts from court records, see 
The Smoking Gun, Michael Jackson's Big Payoff (June 16, 2004), at http://the 
smokinggun.~orn/archive/O6 1 04 ljacko 1 .htrnl. 
83 See Audrey Rogers, Prosectrtonal Use of Expert Testimony in Domestic Violence 
Cases: From Recantation to Refusal to Testzjj, 8 COLUM. J .  GENDER & L. 67, 67 (1998) 
("'Moon prosecutor made no attempt to call an expert witness to explain Mrs. Moon's 
recantation of her earlier statement that Moon 'beat the s**t out of me"'). 
84 See Cheryl Hama, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic 
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1851 (1996). 
Id. at 1863 (although some prosecutors' offices employ "hard policies preventing 
victims from routinely dropping cases, other prosecutors' offices employ so-called "soft" 
policies whereby prosecutors do not force victims to participate in the criminal process but, 
rather, provide victims with support services and encourage them to continue the process). 
86 See S.A. v. Superior Court, 831 P.2d 1297 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding 
prosecutor's subpoena to unwilling victim to force her to testify). 
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It is important to mention several points that might influence the 
prosecutor's resolution of the problem. First, in contrast to the Kobe Bryant 
case in which the proof of guilt appeared to be steadily e r ~ d i n ~ , ~ ' t h e  case 
against the "Bedroom Bandit" appears relatively strong. Observers of the 
Bryant case suggested that the prosecutor's case had weakened from rulings by 
the trial judge that allowed the defense to introduce evidence of the victim's 
- - 
prior sexual conduct and the victim's own decision to sue the defendant in civil 
court. There are no such weaknesses with respect to Kay's testimony. 
Moreover, in contrast to domestic violence prosecutions, there is no suggestion 
that Kay has been intimidated by her batterer fiom testifying, or would face 
hrther violence from the defendant or anyone else if she decided to testify.88 
To be sure, by testifying, Kay will be exposing herself in a public arena to 
difficult and possibly embarrassing questioning. But these consequences, of 
course, are experienced by all courtroom witne~ses.'~ 
The prosecutor also is aware that issuing a subpoena to Kay that forces her 
to appear in court and give testimony may not only be ineffective, but may 
appear to be "re-victimizing" the victim for the actions of the defendant. 
Obviously, if Kay decides to recant her previous statements, the rosecutor will 
face the difficult task of hying to impeach his own witness! Whether the 
prosecutor will be able to impeach her testimony under the applicable rules of 
evidence9' or introduce contemporaneous statements made by Kay under 
available hearsay exceptions, is problematic.92 Further, although a prosecutor 
" See Johnson, supra note 81 (legal scholars who closely followed the Bryant 
proceedings believed that the prosecutor's case hade been steadily weakening after rulings 
by the trial judge, the accidental release of sealed information about Mr. Bryant's accuser, 
and the woman's own decision to sue Bryant in civil court). 
See Hanna, supra note 84, at 1865-66 (critics of "no drop" prosecution policies in 
domestic violence cases suggest that such policies place abused women at greater risk of 
harm). 
' Evidentiary rules, such as "rape shield laws," protect rape victims from being 
questioned about their sexual history, including past sexual behavior and sexual 
predisposition. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID 412. See also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 3 60.43 (2004) 
(barring evidence of victim's sexual conduct in non-sex offense cases). 
90 The common law rule against impeaching one's own witness has been abolished by 
statute in many jurisdictions. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID 607 ("The credibility of a witness may 
be attacked by any party, including the party calling the witness."). For a discussion of the 
common law rule, see Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). 
If Kay testified and made statements inconsistent with previous statements she gave 
to the police, Kay could be impeached by the prosecutor confronting her with those prior 
statements. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID 61 3. 
92 There are various hearsay exceptions under which Kay's prior statements might be 
admissible. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID 803(1) (present sense impression); FED. R. EVID 803(2) 
(excited utterance); FED. R. EVID 803(3) (then existing mental, emotional, or physical 
condition); FED. R. EVID 803(4) (statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment): 
FED. R. EVID, 803(5) (recorded recollection). If Kay did not testify, then it is highly 
questionable whether her prior statements could be introduced under a hearsay exception. 
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation violated if "testimonial" statements are sought to be admitted under hearsay 
exceptions if declarant did not testify at trial and the defendant had no opportunity to cross- 
examine declarant). 
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faced with an unraveling case ordinarily will attempt to negotiate a favorable 
plea bargain, the facts in Problem 4 indicate that no acceptable plea deal can be 
arranged. 
In the end, the best response to Problem 4 is to acknowledge that there is 
no satisfactory response. Problem 4 is a paradigmatic challenge to a 
prosecutor's duty to do justice. A prosecutor must balance the seriousness of 
the offense, the strength of the case, and the public interest in punishing the 
defendant and deterring other offenders against the harm to the victim from 
being forced to testify. The tensions for an ethical prosecutor between 
convicting and punishing a dangerous offender while at the same time 
recognizing that his victim refuses to be the means to that end, and deferring to 
his victim's wishes, ultimately will leave one goal unattainable. 
111. CONCLUSION 
Given the increasingly prominent role of the victim in the criminal justice 
process, it is necessary to examine from an ethical standpoint the proper role of 
the prosecutor in litigating cases involving victims. Prosecuting crimes against 
victims has inherent advantages for prosecutors, but also has special challenges 
that require a prosecutor to reconcile conflicting duties to the public and the 
accused. Focusing on a prosecutor's relations with a victim illuminates the 
prosecutor's duty to serve justice, particularly where a prosecutor's capacity to 
evaluate a case objectively might be compromised by her close alignment with 
a person who has been victimized by crime. The four problems discussed in 
this Article highlight difficult issues in which a prosecutor's duty to serve 
justice and behave neutrally may be undermined by the participation of a crime 
victim. 
Problem 1 addresses the ethical problem of a prosecutor "serving two 
masters" by simultaneously representing a victim while engaged in prosecuting 
the victim's offender. Problem 2 deals with prosecutors who, for personal or 
tactical reasons, so closely align themselves with victims that they engage in 
unethical conduct that violates their duty of neutrality. Problem 3 sheds light on 
a prosecutor's obligation not to cede key decision-making power to the victim. 
Finally, Problem 4 examines a prosecutor's dilemma when a victim is 
unwilling to testify. Here the prosecutor must decide whether the cause of 
justice demands that a dangerous offender be prosecuted, even by forcing an 
unwilling victim to testify. Although these problems do not lend themselves to 
categorical resolution, they do raise issues that could improve the prosecutor's 
service to justice in prosecutions involving victims. 
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